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Commuting, spatial search and labour market bargaining: an equilibrium model 
 
Abstract: We develop an equilibrium job search model in which employees incur 
endogenous commuting costs.  This model leads to the following conclusions: 
1. Firms partially compensate workers for the incurred commuting costs. 
2. When workers have more bargaining power, they will receive less compensation for 
the incurred commuting costs. 
3. The average commuting costs are an increasing function of the productivity level of 
the workers, but a decreasing function of the unemployment benefit level. 
4. Given balanced growth, the average commuting costs are proportional to the average 
wage in the long run. 
5. Given balanced growth, the average commuting time is constant in the long run, but 
the average commuting distance and speed are increasing over time. 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the central themes in the theory of commuting behaviour is that when housing and 
labour markets are perfect, wages and prices for house services will compensate for 
commuting costs (see Alonso, 1964; Madden, 1985; Ihlanfeldt, 1992; Zax, 1991).  
Although empirical studies have demonstrated that workers indeed receive compensation 
for commuting expenses in both the housing and the labour market, the general 
conclusion is that this compensation tends to be only partial (Small, 1992; Ihlanfeldt, 
1992; but see Zax, 1991). This suggests the occurrence of market imperfections such as 
discrimination (see Holzer, 1994), residential moving costs or incomplete information 
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(see van Ommeren et al., 2000).  Empirical studies such as Zax (1991) or Ihlanfeldt 
(1992) also demonstrate that compensation for commuting expenses varies widely among 
different types of workers (males versus females, whites versus blacks) which "suggests 
that labour market power may help determine the extent to which workers can shift the 
burden of commuting expenses onto their employers " (Zax, 1991, page 205).  The 
current paper aims to address this issue by developing a commuting model which 
explicitly takes labour market imperfections and bargaining between workers and 
employers into account.   
 
More generally, the current paper can be interpreted as an attempt to understand 
commuting behaviour from a job search perspective.  Job search theory is currently the 
main theoretical and empirical framework to analyse labour markets, building on the 
work of Stigler (1961, 1962).  Search theory allows for market imperfections (lack of 
information, moving costs), and therefore avoids the problems associated with the 
standard urban economics model which assumes that markets are perfect (see Anas, 
1982; Hamilton, 1982, 1989).  Although the number of studies on commuting behaviour 
which explicitly make use of search theory is steadily increasing (see for example, 
Sugden, 1980; Simpson, 1980; van den Berg and Gorter, 1997; Rouwendal and Rietveld, 
1994; Holzer, 1994;  van Ommeren et al., 1999, 2000), these studies have been based on 
partial search models (an exception is Rouwendal, 1998).  In contrast, the current study 
makes use of an equilibrium search model, also referred to as a job matching model (so 
search behaviour of job seekers and employers are both explicitly modelled and 
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commuting costs, wages, number of unemployed and number of vacancies are 
endogenously determined).   
  
In this paper, we focus on the determinants and consequences of workers’ commuting 
costs extending an equilibrium job search model often associated with the work of 
Pissarides (see Pissarides, 1990, 2000).  One of the essential assumptions of this model is 
that workers and employers search for each other, and when they meet, they bargain 
about wage levels and decide whether or not to form a match. Based on this model, we 
are able to answer questions such as: how do labour market variables such as labour 
market tightness, productivity levels and unemployment benefits affect commuting costs?  
What determines the ratio of commuting costs to wages?  To what extent are employees 
compensated for the incurred commuting costs? To most of these questions, the model 
generates unambiguous answers.  Average commuting costs can be demonstrated to be an 
increasing function of the productivity level of workers (which may explain why 
empirical studies usually find that educational achievement has a positive effect on 
commuting distance (see, Rouwendal and Rietveld, 1994).  Firms partially compensate 
workers for the incurred commuting costs.  
  
In the model, the productivity level plays an important role as it determines the average 
commuting costs and wage level. The 20th-century labour market has been characterised 
by historically high levels of productivity growth, whereas the unemployment rate has 
remained roughly constant.  We proceed therefore by making assumptions which 
guarantee that the unemployment rate does not depend on productivity level.  Given this 
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balanced growth characterisation of the long run, the model implies that the ratio of the 
average commuting costs to the average wage must be constant in the long run. In order 
to derive a result which can be more easily tested, we proceed by making an assumption 
on the relationship between monetary commuting costs and travel speed. Given the 
assumption that the monetary costs are proportional to the travel speed, the model implies 
that the average commuting time is independent of the productivity level, and therefore 
constant in the long run (for a discussion of the empirical regularity of constant travelling 
time, and an extensive list of references see Golob et al., 1981).   
 
As has been demonstrated elsewhere (Zax, 1991, 1994, Van Ommeren et al., 1998), 
workers’ commuting behaviour  depends on the spatial configuration of firms. Most 
studies take the spatial configuration of firms as given, and focus on one of the following 
extremes. At one extreme, it is presumed that firms are located at the same location in the 
Central Business District: the monocentric model. At the other extreme, it is presumed 
that there exists a continuum of firms uniformly distributed over space - the dispersed 
employment model. The monocentric model focuses on the optimal residential location 
of workers, and how house prices depend on the distance to the Central Business District. 
In contrast, in the dispersed employment model, house prices do not vary over space, and 
are therefore ignored, but it allows for a more realistic characterisation of the labour 
market (Seater, 1979, van Ommeren et al.,1998).1 In the current paper, we will analyse 
                                                           
1
 The appropriateness of the assumptions, and therefore the usefulness of the model, depends on 
the spatial configuration of jobs. It is useful to distinguish between non-overlapping urban areas, 
dominant in the United States, and overlapping urban areas, like the Netherlands, Belgium, or the 
Ruhr area in Germany.  A priori, it is expected that the dispersed employment model is more 
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commuting behaviour using a dispersed employment model. 
 
The outline of the current paper is as follows: in section 2, we introduce the job matching 
model. In section 3, we derive properties of commuting behaviour in the short and long 
run.  In section 4, we focus on commuting time and endogenous travel speed.  Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1 The job matching model 
We presume a continuum of identical firms and residences, which are uniformly 
distributed over a two-dimensional space. The economy is closed.2 Each residence is 
inhabited by one identical individual, who is either unemployed or employed. The 
unemployed search for jobs, the employed do not search (for an equilibrium model which 
includes on-the-job search, see Mortensen, 1994) . The employed incur commuting costs 
t, where t includes both monetary and travel time costs. The unemployed search 
sequentially throughout geographical space, facing a uniform distribution of commuting 
costs. The commuting costs become known at the moment the unemployed job seeker 
and firm contact each other. A firm consists of only one job, which is either filled or 
unfilled. In order to fill a job, firms post a vacancy.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
appropriate to explain commuting behaviour in overlapping urban areas, whereas the monocentric 
model is more appropriate to explain behaviour in non-overlapping urban areas. 
2
 The analogy is a long, narrow economy – effectively one-dimensional – that stretches 
sufficiently far that we can disregard boundary conditions. 
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It is relevant here to distinguish between random search and spatial search technologies 
(Seater 1979; Maier,1995; van Ommeren, 1998). Random search implies that jobseekers 
search randomly throughout space, whereas spatial search implies that the jobseekers 
follow a certain spatial pattern.  The assumption that all firms and individuals are 
identical implies that jobseekers prefer to contact the nearest firm, since a match with the 
nearest firm guarantees the lowest commuting costs.   Given the assumption of sequential 
search, a plausible assumption is that jobseekers search randomly within an area in which 
a contact is expected to generate a job match.  So, we will presume that jobseekers will 
not search in locations where there is a zero probability of generating a job match. 
 
Suppose there are L identical individuals in the labour force. We let u denote the 
unemployment rate and let  v denote the vacancy rate, defined as number of vacant jobs 
as a fraction of the labour force L. We assume the existence of a matching function 
n(uL,vL,T) that gives the number of contacts between unemployed and firms as a 
function of the number of unemployed uL looking for jobs, the number of firms looking 
for workers vL and the maximum commuting costs T. We assume a separable structure: 
n(uL,vL,T) = G(T).m(uL,vL), where m(uL,vL) is the number of matches when T is 
infinite. We interpret G(T) as the share of matched combinations of unemployed and 
vacancies that are within the range T. The nonspatial component of the matching function 
m is assumed increasing in both its arguments, concave, and has constant returns to scale 
(empirical studies generally accept the assumption of an aggregate matching function 
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with constant returns to scale, see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)3. The spatial 
component of the matching function G is assumed to be non-decreasing in the maximum 
search range T. Because G(T) is interpreted as the share of matched combinations of 
unemployed and vacancies within the relevant search area, we have G(0) = 0, G(T) → 1 
for T → ∞, and G’(T) > 0. 
 
Given the constant returns to scale assumption, it follows that q, the nonspatial 
component of the rate at which jobs become contacted, can be written as: 
 
),1,1()1,(),(
θ
m
v
u
m
vL
vLuLmq ===  
 
where θ=v/u. So, θ is a measure of labour market tightness, defined as the ratio of the 
vacancy to the unemployment rate. Thus, q depends negatively on the ratio of the 
vacancy to the unemployment rate, θ, and to emphasise this, we will write the job contact 
rate as Gq(θ). Similarly, it can be seen that the rate at which the unemployed become 
contacted equals θGq(θ).  Making use of the assumption that the nonspatial component of 
the matching function has constant returns to scale, it can be easily shown that θq(θ), the 
nonspatial component of the rate at which the unemployed are contacted, depends 
positively on θ. 
 
                                                           
3
 Most empirical studies have been based on aggregate data,  but the number of studies which 
estimate spatial matching functions is steadily increasing (e.g., Burda and Profit, 1996; Coles and 
Smith, 1996; Burgess and Profit, 2001). 
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2.2 Employed and Unemployed 
An individual receives a wage w when employed and incurs commuting costs t, and 
receives unemployment benefits z when unemployed. When employed, the commuting 
costs are exogenous to the worker (note however that workers and firms are able to 
influence the level of commuting costs by rejecting job matches, so commuting 
behaviour is endogenous in the model). In contrast, the wage is endogenous and the firm 
and unemployed bargain about the wage w. Given the value of the commuting costs t, 
firm and unemployed will bargain about the wage w, so w =w(t). The worker will not 
keep the job forever. With probability λ , the worker will lose the job and become 
unemployed. The discount rate is denoted as r.  
 
We denote by U and W(t) the expected (discounted) lifetime income of the unemployed 
and employed respectively. The lifetime income of the employed can be written as: 
 
))(()()( tWUttwtrW −+−= λ   (1) 
 
So, the lifetime income of the employed is equal to the sum of the net wage- the wage 
minus the commuting costs - and the expected change in lifetime income due to the 
probability of losing the job.  
 
When firms and unemployed contact each other, they will only form a match when W(t) 
> U. We will demonstrate later on that this implies that there exists a maximum 
acceptable commuting cost T, called the reservation commuting costs, at which the 
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unemployed (and the firm) is indifferent between forming a match or continuing search. 
It follows that only jobs incurring commuting costs less than T are accepted.  
 
So, the unemployed become employed at rate Gθq(θ). When unemployed, the job seeker 
does not know the value of the commuting costs t, but only the (cumulative) distribution 
of the commuting costs G(T), implying that the lifetime utility of the unemployed can be 
written as: 
 
))(( UWqGzrU e −+= θθ
  (2) 
 
where We denotes the conditional expectation of the lifetime utility when employed, so 
)( TtWEW e ≤= . Interpretation of this Bellman equation is as follows: the unemployed 
receives benefits z and has a probability Gθq(θ) of becoming employed, expecting to 
receive an increase in lifetime income equal to We -U. 
 
2.3 Job creation 
The value of a vacancy, V, can be written as: 
 
))(( VJGqpcrV e −+−= θ
  (3) 
 
where pc denotes the firms’ hiring costs, which are presumed to be proportional to 
productivity and Je denotes the conditional expectation of the job’ s net worth. Vacancies 
are filled at rate Gq(θ). The value of an occupied job with commuting costs, denoted as 
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J(t), can be written as: 
 
JtwptrJ λ−−= )()( , or, similarly, λ+
−
=
r
twp
tJ )()( .  (4) 
 
where p denotes the productivity level. In equilibrium, all profit opportunities from new 
jobs are exploited, driving rents from vacant jobs to zero, so V = 0. This equilibrium 
condition determines the supply of vacancies, implying that: 
 
)(
)()(
θ
λλ
Gq
pcr
wpJr ee +=−=+ ,  (5) 
 
where we denotes the expected wage level (so we =E(w|t<T) . So, the net return of the job 
must be equal to the expected capitalised value of the firm’s hiring cost. This condition is 
usually referred to as the job creation condition (Pissarides, 2000). 
 
2.4 Wage determination 
Recall that the commuting costs become known at the moment the unemployed job 
seeker and firm contact each other. The commuting costs are a drawing from a 
homogeneous distribution, and its value becomes known when firms and unemployed 
individuals meet. Given the commuting costs, the unemployed and firm bargain about the 
wage level, and may then accept or reject the match.  In equilibrium, job matches yield a 
local-monopoly surplus. We assume that the total surplus, equal to the sum of the 
workers’ surplus, W(t)-U, and the firms’ surplus J(t)-V, is shared according to the Nash 
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solution to a bargaining problem, according to the following rule: 
 
ββ −
−−=
1))(())(max(arg)( VtJUtWtw   (6) 
 
where β may be interpreted as a measure of the workers’ labour strength, other than the 
’threat points’ U and V, and can also be interpreted as the labour’s share of the total 
surplus. We presume that 0<β<1. The first-order equation satisfies: 
 
))((
1
)( VtJUtW −
−
=− β
β
  (7) 
 
This equation implies that firms and workers agree on which job matches to accept, and 
which to reject.4 The wage can then be written as (see appendix 1): 
 
θβββ pcptztw +++−= ))(1()( ,     t≤T  (8) 
 
The above equation shows that the wage is increasing in the commuting costs t.5 Further, 
and maybe surprisingly, it shows that the strength of the relationship between commuting 
costs and the wage depends negatively on the strength of the bargaining position of the 
                                                           
4
 In equilibrium, V =0, so when J is less than 0, W -U is also less than 0, therefore firms and job 
seekers agree not to form a match. In contrast, when J exceeds 0, W -U exceeds 0, so firms and 
job seekers both agree to form a match. When J =  W -U =0, firm and job seeker are both 
indifferent to forming a match or continuing searching. 
5
 Further, the equation shows that the wage is increasing in the unemployment benefit level, the 
productivity level and the average hiring costs per unemployed. 
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unemployed, measured by 1-β. In other words, when the unemployed receive a higher 
share of the surplus, they receive less compensation for the commuting cost. In the 
extreme situation that β approaches 0, the employed do not rec and will in the denotes in 
the long of eive any compensation for the commuting costs (but the full share of the 
surplus). In the other extreme situation that β approaches 1, workers receive full 
compensation for the commuting costs, but nothing from the surplus. Note that the 
interpretation of equation (8) is partial, since θ is endogenously determined in the model 
(see later). 
  
Maybe surprisingly, labour market tightness θ, defined as the ratio of the vacancy rate to 
the unemployment rate, does not determine the extent to which workers can shift the 
burden of commuting expenses onto their employers.  Note that workers claim a higher 
wage when β is higher (β is exogenous), and with higher wages firms create fewer jobs, 
increasing market tightness, creating a positive relationship between β and labour market 
tightness θ (see Pissarides, 2000).  Consequently, according to the current bargaining 
model, workers who belong to groups which are disadvantaged in the labour market (for 
example, females, blacks), who have lower β’s, and which therefore face high 
unemployment rates relative to vacancy rates (Holzer, 1994), will receive more 
compensation for the commuting costs (but will receive less from the surplus, hence they 
will receive lower wages). So, surprisingly, our model gives a theoretical foundation for 
the claim by Zax (1991) that labour market power determines the extent to which workers 
can shift the burden of commuting expenses onto their employers, but predicts the reverse 
relationship as suggested by the results of Zax (1991). Finally, note that the wage 
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equation does not depend on the distribution G.  This implies that the extent to which 
workers can shift the burden of commuting expenses onto their employers does not 
depend on the distribution of firms and residences. 
 
2.5 Reservation commuting costs 
Job seekers and firms form a match when the commuting costs are less than the 
reservation commuting costs T. The existence of the reservation commuting costs can be 
easily shown.6 The reservation commuting costs T can be derived by the condition that W 
-U is equal to 0, so J is equal to 0. The latter condition implies that: 
 
0)( =− Twp .  (9) 
 
So the firm pays a wage equal to the productivity level, when the incurred commuting 
costs are equal to the reservation commuting costs. Using the wage equation (see (8)), the 
reservation commuting costs can be written as: 
 
θβ
β pczpT
−
−−=
1
  (10) 
 
                                                           
6
 The net wage, defined as the wage minus the commuting costs, is decreasing in the commuting 
costs, since 1-β<1. This implies that the lifetime income W is a decreasing function of the 
commuting costs t which is a sufficient condition for the existence of the reservation commuting 
cost T.  
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so, the reservation commuting costs are equal to the difference between productivity level 
and the unemployment benefits minus a share of the average hiring costs per unemployed 
(pcθ is equal to the hiring costs times the number of vacancies divided by the number of 
unemployed and can therefore be interpreted as the average hiring costs per 
unemployed).   
 
2.6 Equilibrium 
In the steady state, the proportion of individuals who enter unemployment, λ(1-u), must 
be equal to the proportion who would leave unemployment, θq(θ)G(T).  So, the 
unemployment rate can be written as 
 
)()( TGqu θθλ
λ
+
= .  (11) 
 
The expected wage, we, can be written as: 
 
θβββ pcptzw ee +++−= ))(1( .  (12) 
 
where te =E(t|t<T). Combining the job creation condition (5) and the expected wage 
equation (12), we arrive at the following condition: 
 
θβ
θ
λβ pc
TGq
pcr
tzp e =
+
−−−− )()(
)())(1( ,  (13) 
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which states that the firms ’ share of the instantaneous surplus of the match minus the 
additional wage paid due to the bargaining power of the job seeker is equal to the 
expected hiring costs per unemployed. Equation (13) can be solved uniquely for θ.7 
Given θ, the reservation commuting cost T are determined (see (10)), and given θ and T, 
the equilibrium unemployment rate u is determined (12).  So, the full equilibrium has 
been defined. 
 
3 Properties of commuting 
3.1 The short run 
The level of productivity has two effects on the reservation commuting costs (see (10)).  
Firstly, there is a positive effect: a higher productivity level enables firms to recruit 
workers from further away (firms have to pay higher wages to compensate for workers’ 
commuting costs) whilst still being able to generate a surplus. Secondly, there is a 
negative effect: the firms’ hiring cost increase and therefore labour market tightness 
increases, which improves the bargaining position of the unemployed so the reservation 
commuting costs will fall.  However, differentiation of equations (10) and (13) 
establishes that the overall effect of productivity on the reservation commuting costs is 
positive.  Consequently, the reservation commuting costs are an increasing function of 
the productivity level. 
 
Given the value of the reservation commuting costs, we are able to calculate the expected 
commuting costs.  Recall that we have assumed that firms and residences are uniformly 
                                                           
7
 The value of θ can be shown to be independent of T, an envelope property implied by the 
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distributed over space.  Given this distribution, the expected commuting costs, denoted as 
te can be written as follows (which follows from the assumption that firms and residences 
are uniformly distributed over two-dimensional space, see Appendix 2): 
 
Tte 3
2= .   (14) 
 
Consequently, the expected commuting costs are proportional to the reservation 
commuting costs8, and the properties derived above for the reservation commuting costs 
hold also for the expected commuting costs.  As a result, the expected commuting costs 
are an increasing function of the productivity level 9.  
 
 3.2 The long run 
Equation (13) demonstrates that labour market tightness, measured by the variable θ, is 
determined by the productivity level p. To be more precise, the equation implies that 
labour productivity increases labour market tightness. This property of the model is 
intuitive for a short run equilibrium, since higher labour productivity levels increase wage 
levels relative to unemployment benefit levels (and commuting costs) which increase the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
optimality of T. 
8
 When firms and residences are uniformly distributed over one-dimensional space, the expected 
commuting costs are equal to 1/2 T, and the expected commuting costs are also proportional to 
the reservation commuting costs.  
9
 Since labour market tightness is procyclical, the model suggests that average commuting costs 
should be anticyclical over the business cycle. This theoretical result has some empirical 
foundation.  For example, the study by Burgess and Profit (2001) suggests that in good times, the 
unemployed lower their search radius. 
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utility of employment relative to unemployment. As a result, unemployment falls relative 
to the number of vacancies. Nevertheless, it is not an attractive property of a long-run 
equilibrium as it may be inconsistent with balanced growth (Pissarides, 1987; Aghion and 
Howitt, 1994 ). Balanced growth implies that productivity increases do not reduce 
unemployment rates. In the long run, the empirical evidence seems to indicate that wages 
completely absorb productivity increases, and productivity increases do not decrease 
unemployment levels (see also Wilson, 1995) 10. We will therefore investigate restrictions 
which may guarantee that labour market tightness is independent of productivity level p.  
 
In the model above both productivity level p and  the unemployment benefit level are 
exogenous. However, it is plausible to assume that the unemployment benefit z is 
proportional to the productivity level:  
 
pz η=   (15) 
 
The above assumption is usually justified in the balanced growth literature on the 
grounds that z is primarily unemployment insurance income, which is fixed in terms of 
the average wage rate (see, for example, Pissarides, 2000, p. 21). This implies that: 
 
θβ
βη pcppT
−
−−=
1
  (16) 
                                                           
10
 In particular, the second half of the 20th-century has been characterised by historically high 
levels of productivity and wage growth, in all but a few countries, but unemployment rates have 
remained roughly constant. 
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and making use of equations (10) and (12), and the relationship between reservation 
commuting costs and the expected commuting costs (T =3/2te), we obtain the following 
two equations for the expected wage and the expected commuting costs. 
 
θββηβ pcptpw ee +++−= ))(1(
  (17) 
 
and 
 
)
1
)(3/2( θβ
βη pcppt e
−
−−=   (18) 
 
If we substitute now the expected commuting costs equation into the expected wage 
equation, then it follows that the expected wage and the expected commuting costs are 
both proportional to the productivity level, implying that expected commuting costs are 
proportional to the expected wage, when labour market tightness does not depend on 
productivity. Using equations (11, 13, 15 and 17), it can be seen that labour market 
tightness and unemployment do not depend on the productivity level p only when G(T) is 
independent of T, so ∂G/∂T = 0. Thus, balanced growth can only be obtained as a 
property of this model when distance friction in the matching process is unaffected by 
productivity changes (G(T)=constant). An example might be an island economy where 
transport costs are so low that all jobs and workers are within the critical search range so 
that increases in the search range induced by productivity changes do not lead to a more 
efficient matching process. Another possible case for a constant distance friction is found 
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when productivity changes might be expected to lead to relocation of households further 
away from employment centres. In such an analysis also spatially differentiated housing 
prices would play a role. This relocation behaviour would imply an increase in the 
distance related matching frictions that would counterbalance the decrease in matching 
frictions owing to the longer search range.  However, in the present model such 
relocation behaviour does not take place since we have assumed a uniform spatial 
distribution of jobs and houses. Another possible case is that increases in the area of 
search induces more job specialisation, which increases productivity without reducing 
unemployment levels.  Finally, it is plausible that the value of being unemployed, z, is 
endogenously determined by the government aiming to keep the unemployment rate 
(roughly) constant. In this case, the value of being unemployed increases overtime, but 
the balanced growth assumption still holds. 
 
4.  Commuting time and endogenous travel speed 
Recall that all job seekers are assumed to be identical, so the expected wage is equal to 
the average wage and the expected commuting costs are equal to the average commuting 
costs. Consequently, the balanced growth assumption implies that average commuting 
costs are proportional to the average wage in the long run, which can be tested in 
principle. 
 
Although the relationship between average commuting costs and average wages is in 
principle testable, we realise that empirical investigations of this relationship may be 
difficult, since workers’ commuting costs consist of two components - monetary 
commuting costs and travel time costs - and the measurement of these two components 
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over time is not straightforward.  In order to generate a relationship which can be more 
easily tested, we will proceed by making an assumption on the relationship between 
monetary commuting costs and travel speed in the next section. 
 
Above we have presumed that the commuting costs are determined by a drawing from a 
homogeneous distribution, ignoring the travel mode decision. Here we extend the model 
by assuming that the unemployed search through space and contact vacancies at a 
commuting distance d. So, the commuting distance d is determined by a drawing from a 
homogeneous distribution. The commuting costs are then determined by the travel mode 
conditional on the commuting distance d. The choice of the travel mode determines of 
course the travel speed. 
 
It is useful to distinguish between monetary travel costs per one distance unit, denoted as 
$m, and the time travel costs, which depend on the travel speed. The value of the time 
travel costs is determined in the labour market model. Under the condition that the 
employee has no preference between time spent commuting or time spent working and 
the condition that the employees can freely choose the number of working hours per day, 
the hourly time travel costs are equal to the wage rate. In some cases, these conditions are 
too restrictive. For example, employees may prefer commuting, when the commute 
involves walking or involves listening to the radio in the car. In other words, the hourly 
time travel costs may be less, or more, than the wage rate. We therefore assume that the 
hourly time travel costs are proportional to the wage rate with parameter ψ.  Further, for 
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convenience, we normalise the number of working hours per day to 1 such that the wage 
is equal to the wage rate. 
 
We denote the speed of travel with s, so d/s denotes the travel time, which implies that 
the hourly time travel costs can be written as ψwd/s. We denote the monetary costs per 
distance with $m. Total commuting costs t can then be written as: 
 
dm
s
w
t )$( +=
   (19) 
 
The monetary costs per distance, $m, depend on the travel mode and therefore on the 
travel speed. Here it is assumed that the monetary costs per distance are proportional to 
(and increasing in) the speed s. 11 This implies that total commuting costs can be written 
as: 
 
ds
s
w
t )( τψ +=    τ>0, ψ>0  (20) 
 
                                                           
11
 The standard way to study modal choice is to apply discrete choice methods. In the present 
context we model it as a continuous model for speed choice. Clearly, as one proceeds from one 
mode to the other (for example bike to bus) a discrete jump takes place in terms of both speed and 
costs. A listing of the various modes according to average speed and cost per km travelled 
confirms that the two features are indeed close to proportional (for example, Bouwman, 2000). 
Also, as one travels faster within a given transport mode (for example car) the monetary costs per 
km travelled will be higher. 
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Conditional on the commuting distance, the employee will choose the optimal speed by 
minimising the total costs t. The first-order condition implies then that: 
 
ψ ms
s
w $== τ ,  (21) 
 
in other words, the optimal speed is chosen such that the time travel costs are equal to the 
monetary travel costs.  This latter result has some empirical foundation. 12 So, it follows 
that s can be written as τψ /w . Consequently, the total travel costs can be written as: 
 
d
s
w
t ψ2=   (22) 
 
So, the commuter chooses the travel speed such that the total travel costs are twice the 
time travel costs.  
 
Recall that we have demonstrated (at the end of section 3.2) that in the long run the 
average commuting costs are proportional to the average wage, which guarantees a 
consistent equilibrium growth path. This has several important implications. The first 
implication is that the average commuting time is independent of the productivity level 
and therefore constant in the long run, whereas the average commuting distance and the 
                                                           
12
 For example in the Netherlands the monetary value of a trip by car is about 12-15 Eurocents 
per km. The average value of time is about 8 Euro per hour (see HCG, 1990). Then with an 
average speed of 60 kms per hour the time costs are 800/60=13.3 Eurocents per km. 
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average speed are increasing in the productivity level. This result can be derived as 
follows: when the average travel costs are proportional to the average wage rate then it 
follows that average commuting time, denoted as E(d/s), is insensitive to variations in the 
productivity level (see Appendix 3). Moreover, an increase in the productivity level 
implies higher wages and therefore higher time travel costs and thus higher monetary 
travel costs, see equation (21).  Consequently,  the average speed s increases. A constant 
average commuting time and an increasing travel speed implies an increase in the 
average commuting distance. Alternatively, when the balanced growth assumption does 
not hold (see section 3.2), average commuting time decreases over time, because the 
increase in travel speed dominates the increase in commuting distance.13 
 
5. Conclusion 
The model introduced in the current paper is an extension of a standard matching model, 
which aims to analyse equilibrium unemployment, using search theory (unemployed 
search for jobs; firms search for applicants). This matching model is essentially a macro 
economic model using micro economic behavioural assumptions on job search, 
recruitment and wage bargaining. We have extended this standard basic model by 
presuming that workers incur commuting costs. Jobseekers and firms determine the 
average commuting costs by rejecting matches which are not profitable (commuting costs 
of unprofitable matches are too high). The maximum commuting costs, the wage level, 
unemployment and vacancy rate are then endogenously determined. 
 
                                                           
13
 In the short run, it is plausible that the travel speed remains constant, so the average commuting 
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Labour market imperfections (for example, search costs) and bargaining between workers 
and employers play an essential role in the model. In contrast to models that exclude 
(labour) market imperfections, but in line with most of the empirical literature, workers 
are only partially compensated for the incurred commuting costs.  In line with the 
findings of Zax (1991), we demonstrate that labour market power determines the extent 
to which workers can shift the burden of commuting expenses onto their employers, but, 
maybe surprisingly, the model predicts that workers belonging to groups which have 
more labour market power will receive less compensation. 
 
Commuting costs are endogenously determined in the current model, which enables us to 
derive the effect of a number of labour market variables on average commuting costs. 
The average commuting costs are an increasing function of the productivity level of the 
workers, but a decreasing function of the unemployment benefit level. 
 
The concept of balanced growth has been introduced in the search-equilibrium literature 
by Pissarides (1990).  Balanced growth in a labour market model implies that in the long 
run when productivity levels grow, the unemployment rate will remain constant. One of 
the implications of balanced growth is that the ratio of the average commuting costs to 
average wages remains constant.  Given the assumption that the monetary costs are 
proportional to the travel speed, the average commuting time is independent of the 
productivity level, and consequently constant in the long run. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
time may increase as a result of a productivity increase. 
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Appendix 1: The Wage Equation 
Equations (5) and (7) imply that: 
 
)(1 θβ
β
Gq
pcUW e
−
=−
  (23) 
 
whereas equations (2) and (23) imply that: 
 
pczrU β
βθ
−
+=
1
.  (24) 
 
Further, equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
 
λ+
−−
=−
r
rUtwUW .  (25) 
 
Making use of equations (7) and (4) and the 3 above mentioned equations reveals that: 
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1
.  (26) 
 
Reordering of the second part of the equation, gives us wage equation (8). 
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 Appendix 2: The Expected Commuting Costs 
The assumption of homogeneous distribution of residences and vacancies, implies that 
the conditional cumulative distribution of commuting costs G (t|t<T) is equal to 2tπ/πT2 
=2t/T2.  The conditional expected commuting costs are then 2/3 T. 
 
Appendix 3: The Expected Commuting Time  
Expected commuting time E(d/s) is equal to E(t/w)/2ψ (see equation (22)).  Note that the 
wage w is a linear function of commuting costs t, so w =a +kt, where a is proportional to 
productivity level p and k is equal to 1 - β (see (8) and (15)). Further, as noted in 
Appendix 2, the density of commuting costs equals 2t/T². So, E(t/w) can be written as: 
a
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2
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2
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+ ∫∫  where  b =k/a, 
since log (1+bx) =bx - (bx)2/2+ (bx)3/3- (bx)4/4+...   for bx<1 using a Taylor series 
approximation.  Note that T and parameter a are both proportional to productivity level p, 
so we may conclude that the (approximated) expected commuting time is independent of 
the productivity level.  The approximation is especially good for lower values of bT.  
Reasonable values of b and T are 0.5 and 0.5 respectively (so the reservation commuting 
costs are 50 % of the wage and bargaining power is equal to 0.5, which is reasonable 
according to Pissarides, 2000).  In this case, the approximation error of expected 
commuting time is about 0.36% 
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